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"MENTAL ILLNESS": A SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATOR IS PUNISHED TWICE
FOR ONE CRIME
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kansas v. Hendricks,1 the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of detaining an individual pursuant to the Kan-
sas Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act) 2 The Court held that
the Act's civil commitment procedure meets constitutional re-
quirements8 Supreme Court precedent4 has established that
civil confinement, to comport with constitutional due process
requirements, requires a showing of both mental illness and
dangerousness! The Court held that the Act's requirement of a
"mental abnormality or personality disorder" satisfies the "men-
tal illness" standard.6 The Court also held that under the Act,
Kansas may detain an individual against his will without violat-
ing the Constitution's prohibitions on double jeopardy and ex
post facto laws, despite the fact that the defendant was already
serving a prison sentence when the law was enacted. The Court
found that the Act is a civil, nonpunitive law,8 and therefore
renders irrelevant the Constitution's Double Jeopardy9 and Ex
Post Facto Clauses,10 which are only implicated by criminal stat-
utes."
1117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
2 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
3 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
' Key cases include Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (holding that the state
has the power to confine people who are dangerous and mentally ill) and Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that due process requires that a civil confinee
be proven both mentally ill and dangerous).
" See, e.g., Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-76.
6 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
7 Id. at 2085.
8 Id. at 2082.
' "No person shall.., be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
'0 "No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
" Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085.
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This Note argues that the Court erred in upholding the
constitutionality of the Act. First, this Note observes that Kan-
sas' stated reason for enacting the law was to enable the state to
confine people who are not mentally ill.12 Therefore, this Note
concludes, the Court was wrong to decide that the Act requires
a showing of mental illness. s Second, this Note argues that the
language of the Act, its legislative history, and the implementa-
tion of the Act show that punishment is a primary goal of the
statute. Confining an individual who was already serving time in
prison at the time the Act was passed thus violates the Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution.
1 4
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE KANSAS SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT
In July, 1993, a Kansas college student named Stephanie
Schmidt was brutally raped and murdered by a co-worker. 5 Her
attacker recently had been paroled from a rape sentence.1
6
Schmidt's death sparked the formation of an Ad Hoc Sexual Of-
fender Task Force (Schmidt Task Force) ,' which lobbied for
legislation to prevent similar crimes by repeat sexual offenders.'
The Schmidt Task Force proposed the Kansas Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Act to the Kansas legislature, 19 which enacted it in
1994.0 The Act creates a civil procedure by which persons
found to be sexually violent predators may be committed
against their will for an indefinite period of time.
2
,KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
"See infra section V.A.
14 See infra section V.B.
'" Petitioner's Brief at 3, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649);
Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 4, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (Nos. 95-
1649, 95-9075).
16 Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 4, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075).
17 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Hendricks (No. 95-1649); Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 4, Hen-
dricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075). The task force included legislators, law enforcement
personnel, parole board members, probation officers, and concerned citizens, but
did not include any mental health professionals. Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 4, Hen-
dricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075).
" Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 4, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075).
9 Id.
20 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a15 (1994).
2' KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994 & Supp. 1996). In this preamble, the Act
states:
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A person found to be a sexually violent predator must have
a mental abnormality or personality disorder, must be likely to
engage in future sexually violent acts, and must have commit-
ted, or at least been charged with committing, a sexually violent
offense.22 "Mental abnormality" under the Act is a predisposi-
tion to commit sexually violent offenses.2 However, the Act fails
to define "personality disorder." The Act lists four categories of
persons who "may meet the criteria of a sexually violent preda-
tor," and who thus would be subject to the provisions of the
Act.24 The categories are: (1) a person who has been convicted
of a sexually violent offense; (2) a person who has been charged
with a sexually violent offense and who has been determined to
be incompetent to stand trial; (3) a person who has been found
not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent offense; and
(4) a person who has been found not guilty of a sexually violent
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually vio-
lent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders
them appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the treatment act for
mentally ill persons defined in K.SA 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto,
which is intended to provide short-term treatment to individuals with serious
mental disorders and then return them to the community. In contrast to per-
sons appropriate for civil commitment tinder K.SA. 59-2901 et seq. and amend-
ments thereto, sexually violent predators generally have antisocial personality
features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities
and those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.
The legislature further finds that sexually violent predators' likelihood of engag-
ing in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. The existing involuntary
commitment procedure pursuant to the treatment act for mentally ill persons
defined in K-S. 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto is inadequate to ad-
dress the risk these sexually violent predators pose to society. The legislature fur-
ther finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent predators in a
prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very long term
and the treatment modalities for this population are very different than the tra-
ditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the
treatment act for mentally ill persons defined in K.SA. 59-2901 et seq. and
amendments thereto, therefore a civil commitment procedure for the long-term
care and treatment of the sexually violent predator is found to be necessary by
the legislature.
A "sexually violent predator" is defined as "any person who has been convicted of
or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality
or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts
of sexual violence, if not confined in a secure facility." Id. § 59-29a02.
"Id. A "mental abnormality" is defined as "a congenital or acquired condition af-
fecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health
and safety of others." Id.
' Id. § 59-29a03.
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offense and for whom the jury answers in the affirmative to the
question of whether the person has a mental disease or defect.2
The Act requires the custodial agency to notify the local
prosecutor sixty days prior to the expected release of a prisoner
who might meet the Act's criteria.26 The prosecutor then has
forty-five days to file a petition in state court seeking the pris-
oner's involuntary commitment.27 In the event such a petition is
filed, the state district court must decide whether there is prob-
able cause to believe that the person named in the petition is a
sexually violent predator. If the court finds probable cause,
the prisoner is transferred to a secure facility to undergo a pro-
fessional psychiatric examinaion2 If the examiner determines
that the subject is a sexually violent predator, a trial is held for
the purpose of confirming such a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt.0 A person found to be a sexually violent predator is
committed indefinitely, until the mental abnormality or person-
ality disorder has ceased to cause the person to be dangerous.31
The Act includes a number of procedural safeguards: any
person tried subject to the Act is guaranteed the assistance of
counsel; he has the right to be examined by a qualified expert;
he has the option of requesting a trial by jury. Furthermore,
the status of a person committed under the Act is reviewed an-
nually by a qualified professional, and then by the court, to de-
25Id.
26 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1994). The notification period has since been
changed to 90 days, and the agency is now required to notify the attorney general.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1994 & Supp. 1996).27
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04 (1994). The Act now calls for the attorney general to
file a petition within 75 days. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
231d. § 59-29a05. At the probable cause hearing, the charged person has the right
to be represented by counsel; to present evidence; to cross-examine witnesses; and to
view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file. Id
' Id. The Act provides "for an evaluation as to whether the person is a sexually vio-
lent predator. The evaluation shall be conducted by a person deemed to be profes-
sionally qualified to conduct such an examination." Id.
" Id. § 59-29a07. The Act states, "[t]he court orjury shall determine whether, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator.... If the court or
jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent
predator, the court shall direct the person's release." Id.
"MId. The Act provides that "the person shall be committed to the custody of the
secretary of social and rehabilitation services for control, care and treatment until
such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed
that the person is safe to be at large." Id-
32 Id. § 59-29a06.
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termine whether continued detention is warranted.3 A review
also may occur upon petition by the secretary of social and re-
34 35habilitation services or by the committed person.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING PUNISHMENT AND
THE LINE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
A state has the ability to administer punishment by means of
civil, as well as criminal, sanctions. When and how a statute is
determined to be punitive in nature has been addressed by the
Supreme Court, as has the related issue of the dividing line be-
tween civil and criminal procedures.
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Matinez,37 the Court held that two
federal statutes which stripped American citizenship from indi-
viduals evading military service were punitive in nature.3 ' Hav-
ing made that determination, the Court held that both laws
were unconstitutional because they administered punishment
without providing constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fifth39
" Id. § 59-29a08. The state does not shed the burden of proof after the original
commitment:
The burden of proof at the hearing shall be upon the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the committed person's mental abnormality or personality
disorder remains such that the person is not safe to be at large and if released is
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.
Id. The state's failure to meet this standard results in the release of the
person from confinement. Id.
Id. § 59-29a10.
Id. § 59-29a11.
See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevents an already-punished defendant from being subjected to a
civil monetary sanction whose purpose is punishment).
37 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
Id. at 165-66. The statutes in question were the Nationality Act of 1940 and its
successor, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, both of which provided for
the removal of citizenship of a United States citizen who stays outside the country
during awar "for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the [mili-
tary]." Id. at 146 n.1.
39 1d. at 165-66. The Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger, nor shall any person be be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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and Sixth ° Amendments. Writing for the majority, Justice Gold-
berg set out a seven-part test to aid in evaluating whether a stat-
ute is punitive or regulatory. 1 While the Court has never
deemed this test decisive, it has employed these factors to in-
form its analysis of whether a statute is "punitive. 42
Three years later, in Baxstrom v. Herold,43 the Court made
clear that civil and criminal statutes have different purposes,
and that, so long as the civil statute is nonpunitive, there is no
constitutional conflict in applying both to the same individual.
The Court held unanimously thatJohnnie Baxstrom was denied
equal protection when he was civilly committed at the end of his
criminal prison sentence.44 New York law provided jury review
and a judicial determination of mental illness for anyone civilly
committed, except those persons, such as Baxstrom, already
serving out a criminal punishment.45 The Supreme Court disal-
lowed Baxstrom's civil detention due to his failure to receive a
'0 The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. at amend. VI.
" Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69. The relevant inquiries in Justice Goldberg's seven
factor test are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it ap-
plies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned.
Id.
42 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997); United States v. Hal-
per, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)
(holding that pretrial detention based on prediction of dangerousness was not im-
permissible punishment).
4 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
"Baxstrom had served most of a two-and-a-half to three-year sentence for second
degree assault when he was found to be mentally ill. Id. at 108-09. He was transferred
from the New York Department of Correction to the Department of Mental Hygiene,
and held in a mental hospital for more than four additional years by the time his case
was decided by the Supreme Court. Id.
'1d. at 110.
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judicial hearing. 6 In so holding, however, the Court implicitly
allowed the state, if proper procedures are followed, to commit
in a civil proceeding a mentally ill and dangerous person who
already had served a criminal sentence.7 Baxstrom thus estab-
lished the power of the state to punish a mentally ill criminal
and thereafter to commit him in a civil proceeding.
In Allen v. Illinois,49 the Court ruled on the constitutionality
of Illinois' approach to the civil commitment of sexually violent
offenders. The Court held that proceedings under the Illinois
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act are not "criminal," and there-
fore the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination 5
does not apply. 2
In so holding, the Court considered the fact that the statute
is included in Illinois' civil code.' The majority opinion stated
that while labeling a law "civil" is not dispositive, it can be ig-
nored only if the statute is shown to be "'so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' that the
proceeding be civil ... ."5 The Allen Court did not ignore the
label in this case because it did not find that the goals of the I1-
4' Id.
47 Id at 114-15.
48 One commentator has characterized the relevance of the case this way: "Based
on this broad, albeit accepted, reading of the Baxstrom holding, the Court essentially
paved the way for the commitment of sexually violent predators both in lieu of and
subsequent to completion of a criminal sentence." Deborah L. Morris, Constitutional
Implications of the Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators-A Due Process
Analysis, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 594, 601 (1997).
49478 U.S. 364 (1986).
'a 725 ILL COMP. STAT. 205/1.01 (West 1996). The Illinois Act applies to "[a]ll
persons suffering from a mental disorder... coupled with criminal propensities to
the commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts
of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children...." Id. Treatment in a
psychiatric hospital is provided, until the committed person meets the burden of
showing he is no longer dangerous. Id. at 205/8, 205/9.
" The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment was applicable in this
state proceeding through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. U.S.
CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. In a trial under the Illinois Act, at which Allen was found
to be a sexually dangerous person, the testimony of two psychiatrists with whom Terry
Allen had met was admitted as evidence. Id. at 366. Allen claimed that the use of the
psychiatric testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Id- at 370.
Id. at 368.
"Id. at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
1998]
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linois Act are the punishment goals of retribution and/or deter-
55
rence.
The Court also dismissed Allen's alternative argument that,
notwithstanding the nonpunitive nature of the Illinois Act, it
should be considered criminal under Fifth Amendment analysis
because of its use of language and methods associated with
criminal law. 6 According to the Court, simply because the Illi-
nois Act provides criminal trial safeguards does not compel the
conclusion that a trial held pursuant to the Act is a criminal
proceeding. Nor is the Illinois Act rendered criminal because
involuntary detainment may be a result of proceedings under
that Act.5s The Court held that Illinois has a legitimate interest
in "supplement [ing] its parens patriae concerns with measures to
protect the welfare and safety of other citizens."59 Keeping dan-
gerous individuals out of the general population is a legitimate
exercise of that interest.6°
The dissent argued that the statute was criminal in sub-
stance because of the potential loss of liberty involved;61 the
stigma associated with confinement; 62 and the criminal law na-
ture of the proceedings.63 The dissent recognized the state's in-
terest in protecting the public, but argued that such a concern
is not license to disregard protections provided by the Constitu-
tion. 4
In United States v. Salerno,6 the Court carved out another
narrow exception to the general rule that confinement is a pu-
nitive measure. The Court held that statutorily authorized pre-
" Id. at 370 (finding that the aim of the Illinois Act is treatment, not punishment).
'6Id at 371. The Illinois Act provides for safeguards such as the right to counsel,
right to a jury trial, right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 725 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 205/3.01, 205/5
(West 1996).
-







61 Id at 382. The dissent summarized, "[P]ermitting a State to create a shadow
criminal law without the fundamental protection of the Fifth Amendment conflicts
with the respect for liberty and individual dignity that has long characterized, and
that continues to characterize, our free society." Id. at 384 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
6'481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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trial detention based on a prediction of.dangerousness is not
punishment and does not violate the Due Process Clause. 6 The
respondents in the case were detained prior to trial, following
the guidelines of the Bail Reform Act,67 after "the Government
had established by clear and convincing evidence that no condi-
tion or combination of conditions of release would ensure the
safety of the community .... ,6 The detainees contended that
confinement based on the likelihood of future criminal conduct
violates the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process. 9
The Court regarded the Bail Reform Act's legislative history
and the Act's procedural safeguards as evidence of the Act's
regulatory, rather than punitive, nature." Accordingly, the
Court disagreed that the Bail Reform Act authorizes unconstitu-
tional pre-trial punishment.71 The Court also rejected the ar-
gument that the Bail Reform Act, even if not punitive, fails to
provide due process of law.72 In doing so, the Court employed a
balancing test, weighing individual liberty interests against the
governmental regulatory interest in community safety.3 While
recognizing the strength of the individual's right to liberty, the
Court allowed that "this right may, in circumstances where the
government's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to
the greater needs of society. "74
66 Id. at 755.
67 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1994). Under the Bail Reform Act, ajudicial officer decides
whether an arrestee is to be detained until trial. Id. Congress stipulated certain fac-
tors to be used in making that determination: the nature of the charges; the amount
of evidence against the arrestee; the arrestee's background; and the potential danger
posed by the arrestee's release. Id. § 3142. Applicable procedural safeguards include
a detention hearing; the right to counsel at that hearing the right to testify and pres-
ent witnesses; and the requirement that the judicial officer support his finding with
clear and convincing evidence. Id.
'3 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 743-44.
69 Id. at 744-46.
70 Id. at 747-48. According to the Court, "[t]he legislative history of the Bail Re-
form Act clearly indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention pro-
visions as punishment for dangerous individuals .... Congress instead perceived
pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem." Id. at 747.
7' Id. at 747-48.
7 3Id. at 748.
7Id.
7' Id. at 750-51. The Court went on to set the following standard: "When the Gov-
ernment proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identi-
fied and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that,
consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from execut-
ing that threat." Id. at 751.
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that the
majority's distinction between regulatory and punitive legisla-
tion was simplistic and false, and would allow for the evasion of
the Due Process Clause merely by labeling punishment as "regu-
lation."7'5
In United States v. Halper,76 a unanimous Supreme Court held
that a civil sanction may constitute "punishment," and that the
imposition of such punishment following application of a
criminal sanction resulting from the same behavior violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 7 Irwin Halper submitted sixty-five
false medical benefits claims to Blue Cross, cheating the federal
government out of $585.78 He was convicted on sixty-five counts
of violating the criminal false claims statute, sentenced to two
years in prison, and fined $5000. 79 The Government then
brought a civil action pursuant to the False Claims Act,80 under
which Halper was liable for a penalty of more than $130,000.81
He claimed that such a penalty would constitute double jeop-
ardy.
8 2
The Court stated that in certain circumstances a civil pen-
alty can amount to punishment.8 3 Such a determination should
be made not merely by examining the language of the statute
and its history, but "by assessing the character of the actual sanc-
tions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state.
"84
Retribution and deterrence are legitimate governmental goals,
7- Id. at 760 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
76 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
"Id. at 448-49.7
1 Id. at 437.
80 Id at 438. The False Claims Act provided that a person who:
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved ... is liable to the United
States Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the
amount of damages the Government sustains because of the act of that person,
and costs of the civil action.
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982).
8' Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
SId.
8 Id. at 442 (characterizing the civil penalty in this case as "so extreme and so di-
vorced from the Government's damages and expenses as to constitute punishment").
"' Id. at 447.
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concluded the Court, only when pursued through the mecha-
nisms of the criminal justice system.8s
C. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING CIVIL COMMITMENT:
THE "MENTALLY ILL" AND "DANGEROUS" REQUIREMENTS
In order to satisfy constitutional requirements in the civil
commitment of an individual, the state must prove that the per-
son to be detained is both mentally ill and dangerous. 6 Neither
factor, standing alone, will suffice.8 7
In O'Connor v. Donaldson,s a unanimous Court held that it is
a violation of the constitutional right to liberty to confine a
mentally ill but nondangerous individual."' Kenneth Donaldson
was civilly committed and kept against his will in the Florida
State Hospital for more than fourteen years.ta He alleged that
the hospital staff unconstitutionally deprived him of his free-
dom.9' There was no testimony that Donaldson had ever posed
any threat of danger.92 The Court held that there is "no consti-
tutional basis for confining [mentally ill] persons involuntarily if
they are dangerous to no one .... "9'
Four years later, in Addington v. Texas, 94 the Court clearly es-
tablished that the police power of the state provides the consti-
tutional authority for the civil confinement of individuals who
Id. at 448. Applying its analysis to the prohibition against double jeopardy, the
Court stated, "We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy clause a defendant
who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be char-
acterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Id. at 448-49.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992). See discussion of Foucha infra at
text accompanying notes 115-23.
," Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-76.
8422 U.S. 563 (1975).
8I9d. at 576.
" Id. at 564.
9,d& at 565.
2Id- at 568.
9 Id. at 575. The Court also said:
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking a person up
against his will and keeping him indefinitely .... One might as well ask if the
State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive
or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitution-
ally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.
Id.
'4 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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are both dangerous and mentally ill.95 At issue in Addington was
the standard of proof required in a civil commitment proceed-
ing. After a jury found him mentally ill and requiring hospi-
talization,97  Addington appealed, objecting to the jury
instruction regarding the standard of proof.98  A unanimous
Court held that a criminal standard of proof need not be met,9
but that an individual's liberty interest is powerful enough that
proof by a preponderance of the evidence would not satisfy due
process.'"° The Court settled on a middle level of proof, adopt-
ing a "clear and convincing" standard.10 ' The issue decided in
Addington was one of procedural due process. Nevertheless, the
case is often cited 0 2 for its substantive proposition that a show-
ing of dangerousness and mental illness is required to commit
someone in a civil proceeding.
0 3
In Jones v. United States,14 the Court held that a criminal de-
fendant who is found, by a preponderance of evidence, not
guilty by reason of insanity, may be detained in a mental institu-
tion until he regains his sanity or ceases to be dangerous.105 Mi-
chael Jones was charged with attempted petit larceny, but was
Id at 426. The Court said:
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing
care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for
themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.
Id.
, Id. at 419-20.
97 Id at 421.
Id at 421-22. The instructions to the jury read: "1. Based on clear, unequivocal
and convincing evidence, is Frank O'Neal Addington mentally ill? 2. Based on clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence, does Frank O'Neal Addington require hospi-
talization in a mental hospital for his own welfare and protection or the protection of
others?" Id. at 421. Addington argued that substantive due process required that he
be committed only if the state could meet the criminal standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 421-22.
Id. at 431.
'00 Id. at 427.
'0' Id- at 433.
'0' See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2087 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992);Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 362 (1983) (holding that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes
the existence of mental illness).
'0' Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
,04 63 U.S. 354 (1983).
'o' Id. at 370.
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found not guilty by reason of insanity.10 6 After spending more
than a year in a mental hospital, he demanded to be released or
recommitted pursuant to normal civil commitment standards. 7
He argued that his civil commitment failed to satisfy due process
requirements since the judgment of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity is not equivalent to a finding of mental illness, and was
proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. 0 8 He claimed
that Addingtonr09 stands for the proposition that civil commit-
ment requires clear and convincing evidence that the individual
is mentally ill and dangerous.1 0
The Court disagreed, stating that the finding of insanity es-
tablished that Jones was mentally ill."' The Court also distin-
guished Addington as to the burden of proof issue."' The Court
said the Addington ruling was based in part on concerns about
an individual being detained for acceptable but unusual behav-
ior."3 Such concerns are diminished in the case of an individual
who has committed a crime, which is clearly unacceptable be-
havior.'
1 4
Most recently, in Foucha v. Louisiana,15 the Court confirmed
the relevance of the Addington test, holding that a Louisiana
statute" 6 violated due process by allowing civil confinement
without requiring a finding of mental illness." Citing Adding-
ton,"8 the Court noted that to detain someone in a civil proceed-
ing, the State must show that the person is both dangerous and
mentally ill."9 The Court also discussed United States v. Salerno,20
,0 i at 359-60.
,07 Id. at 360. The civil commitment standards Jones argued should apply in his
case included a jury trial and proof by clear and convincing evidence that he was
mentally ill and dangerous. Id.
,
0s Id. at 362.
"9 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
"
0 Jones, 463 U.S. at 362.
.' Id. at 363.
"1 Id. at 367.
113 iTd.
114 i"d.
"' 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
1,6 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:59 (West 1986).
"7 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78. After Terry Foucha was found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity of a burglary charge, he was committed to a psychiatric hospital to be held until
he could prove to supervising doctors that he was not dangerous. Re. at 73-74.
"a 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
"9 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-76. Stated the Court, "Louisiana does not contend that
Foucha was mentally ill at the time of the trial court's hearing. Thus, the basis for
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on which the state relied for the proposition that dangerous
persons who are not mentally ill may nevertheless be confined
in limited circumstances.12 1 Unlike the statute at issue in Salerno,
however, the statute in Foucha was neither sharply focused nor
122strictly limited in duration. Thus, the state could not hold
Foucha unless it satisfied both prongs of the Addington test.2
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. LEROY HENDRICKS
Leroy Hendricks has a lengthy and troubling history of
sexually abusing children. In 1955, Hendricks exposed his geni-
tals to two young girls, whom he invited to play with his penis.2 4
He pleaded guilty to indecent exposure.us Two years later, he
played strip poker with a fourteen-year-old girl and subsequently
was convicted of lewdness. In 1960, he fondled the penises of
two boys, ages seven and eight, for which he was convicted and
spent nearly three years in prison. 7 Soon after his release in
1962, he was arrested for touching a seven-year-old girl's genita-
lia.2 8 During his subsequent incarceration, he was treated for
his sexual deviance in a Washington State psychiatric hospital,
until his discharge in 1965.19 After his release, however, Hen-
dricks returned to his sexually deviant ways, performing oral sex
on an eight-year-old girl and fondling an eleven-year-old boy.'3 °
As a result, in 1967 he was imprisoned againi.13 Following his
holding Foucha in a psychiatric facility as an insanity acquittee has disappeared, and
the State is no longer entitled to hold him on that basis." Id. at 78.
'20 481 U.S. 739 (1987). See discussion of Salerno supra at text accompanying notes
65-75.
12, Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
'2 Id at 81-82. The Court stated that to allow the Louisiana law to stand would "be
only a step away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our present
system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements
for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt
to have violated a criminal law." &dt at 83.
124 Petitioner's Brief at 9, Hendricks (No. 95-1649).
'2 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (1997).
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parole in 1972, Hendricks participated in an outpatient treat-
ment program, but ceased attending after a few months.32
Between 1973 and 1978, Hendricks repeatedly and forcibly
sexually molested his stepdaughter and stepson, when they both
were between the ages of nine and fourteen.3' Then, in 1984,
he was charged with fondling three thirteen-year-old boys in the
electronics store where he worked, and was convicted of two
counts of taking indecent liberties with a child.3
Hendricks has acknowledged that he causes harm to chil-
dren. ' He testified, however, that when he feels stressed, he
cannot control his urge to engage a child in sexual activity.
13 6
He also discounted treatment as "bullshit" and *stated that only
his death would guarantee that he would stop molesting chil-
dren.
13 7
B. THE KANSAS SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT AND LEROY
HENDRICKS
After serving ten years in prison as a result of his latest con-
viction, Hendricks was scheduled to be released to a halfway
house in September of 1 9 9 4 .,s Instead of releasing him, how-
ever, the State sought Hendricks' civil commitment as a sexually
violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act. 3 9 As a person currently incarcerated for having committed
a sexually violent offense, Hendricks fit into one of the four
categories of persons to whom the Act applies. 40  Hendricks
moved to dismiss the state's petition to confine him.'4 ' He ar-
gued that the Act, as applied to him, violated the Constitution's
Due Process, Double Jeopardy, 3 and Ex Post Facto Clauses. 44
122 IcL
Id. at 10.
'' Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 3, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075).
's Petitioner's Brief at 10, Hendricks (No. 95-1649).
136 id.
137 Id. at 11.
'3 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. CL 2072, 2078 (1997).
'3' rle
"
0 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1994 & Supp. 1996). See discussion of the Act supra
at text accompanying notes 15-35.
... Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
142 The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides that "[n]o State
shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
" U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The state district court reserved ruling on the constitutional is-
sues, but found probable cause to support a finding that Hen-
dricks is a sexually violent predator under the Act and should be
evaluated professionally.
4 5
Pursuant to the Act and Hendricks' request, Hendricks was
tried by a jury, which, after hearing evidence about Hendricks'
history, found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a sexually
violent predator.1 6  The trial court subsequently determined
"that pedophilia qualifies as a 'mental abnormality' as defined
by the Act," and had Hendricks committed to the custody of the
State's Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services. 4 7 Hen-
dricks appealed directly to the Kansas Supreme Court,- reiterat-
ing his claim that in applying the Act to him, the State was
violating numerous constitutional provisions.
48
The Kansas Supreme Court reached only Hendricks' sub-
stantive due process challenge. 4 9 The court held that the Act it-
self violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.50 Both Hen-
' See supra note 9 for the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeop-
ardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses both apply in this case of state law through the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
.. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079. See supra note 10 for the text of the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
' Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
46 Id at 2079.
147 Id.
"8 In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 133 (Kan. 1996). Relying on Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71 (1992), Hendricks claimed that his substantive due process rights were
violated by confining him absent a finding that he was "mentally ill" (as opposed to
merely "mentally abnormal"). Id. He also argued that civil confinement constitutes
additional punishment for a crime for which he had already served the prescribed
sentence, and that such punishment violates the Constitution's prohibition against
doublejeopardy and ex post facto laws. Id.
' Id. Because the court decided the due process issue in Hendricks' favor, it did
not consider the alternative arguments raised in Hendricks' appeal. Id. at 138.
"SO Id. The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted United States Supreme Court
precedent to require clear and convincing proof that a person is "mentally ill" if he is
to be committed to a mental institution in a civil proceeding in a manner consistent
with due process. Id
The court decided that the Act lacked a required finding of mental illness. Id.
at 137. In fact, as the court pointed out, the preamble to the Act specifically states
that sexually violent predators do not have a mental illness which "renders them ap-
propriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the treatment act for mentally ill per-
sons defined in K.S.A. §59-2901 et seq." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994 & Supp.
1996). See supra note 21 for the full preamble text. Thus, the court held that "the re-
cord in this case will not support a finding that the statutory requirement of a mental
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dricks and the State of Kansas petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari; both requests were granted and the cases were con-
solidated. 1 The Court examined the due process grounds on
which the Kansas Supreme Court overturned the Act, as well as
Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post facto claims that were
not addressed by the Kansas Supreme Court.'52
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court voted 5-4 to reverse the judgment of the Kansas
Supreme Court, holding that the Kansas Sexually Violent Preda-
tor Act meets substantive due process requirements, and violates
neither the Double Jeopardy nor the Ex Post Facto Clause. 53
1. The Due Process Claim
Justice Thomas, delivering the opinion of the Court,5 4 first
addressed the issue of whether the Act is consistent with sub-
stantive due process rights.55 Recognizing that in certain non-
criminal circumstances it is constitutionally permissible to re-
strain an individual against his will, Justice Thomas held that the
Act does not violate due process requirements."6 States are
permitted to impose forced civil confinement upon persons
"who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose
a danger to the public health and safety."' 57
Justice Thomas pointed out that involuntary civil commit-
ment statutes had been upheld consistently by the Court so long
as the commitment comported with proper procedures and
standards . 5  He also surveyed several prior cases in which the
Court upheld state civil commitment statutes requiring that the
abnormality or a personality disorder is equivalent to the constitutional standard of
mental illness." Hendicks, 117 S. Ct. at 137.
,5 Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996).
112 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
,s' Id. at 2086.
Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy.
, Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
6 Id. at 2081.
,7 Id. at 2079.
'"s Id. at 2080 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1991); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
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person committed be proven both mentally ill and dangerous. 59
According to the Court, the Kansas Act is plainly similar to these
other civil commitment statutes: It requires a finding of future
dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a
"mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" that makes it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous
behavior.l'
Justice Thomas raised and then dismissed Hendricks' ar-
gument that the Kansas legislature's term "mental abnormality"
fails to satisfy the constitutional requirement of "mental ill-
ness."'161 Members of the psychiatric community disagree about
the meaning of mental illness, 6 2 Justice Thomas reasoned, and
the Court itself has "used a variety of expressions to describe the
mental condition of those properly subject to civil confine-
ment.
,163
Ultimately, the Court rejected Hendricks' contention that
the Act is unconstitutional because of its failure to require a
finding of "mental illness."'1' "Contrary to Hendricks' asser-
tion," Justice Thomas stated, "the term 'mental illness' is devoid
of any talismanic significance."'6
2. The Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Claims
Justice Thomas next responded to Hendricks' argument
that the Act establishes criminal proceedings, and therefore his
confinement under the Act violates the Double Jeopardy and Ex
Post Facto Clauses.'6 Justice Thomas wrote that identifying the
intent of the legislature is the first step in determining whether
a particular statute is civil or criminal.67 In this case, Kansas' in-
"9 1d. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) ("mentally retarded" or "mentally
ill" and dangerous); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) ("mentally ill" and danger-
ous); Minnesota ex reL Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cty., 309 U.S. 270 (1940)




6' Id. at 2080-81 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88 ("some medical justification for do-
ing so"); Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26 ("emotionally disturbed" and "mentally ill");
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732, 737 (1972) ("incompetency" and "insanity")).
,
4 Id. at 2081.
1 Id. at 2080.
166 Id. at 2081.
167 Id. at 2082.
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tentions are evidenced by the placement of the Act in the state
probate code, rather than in the criminal code, and by the ref-
erence within the Act itself to its being a "civil commitment pro-
cedure."1r8
Though the legislature's intent is not dispositive, it will be
rejected only if the challenging party "provides 'the clearest
proof that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in pur-
pose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it
'civil." ' 169 Only if such proof is offered will the Court consider
the statute as having created criminal proceedings. 170 Justice
Thomas concluded that Hendricks failed to meet this burden.
There are two primary objectives of criminal punishment:
retribution and deterrence. 2  According to Justice Thomas,
neither is implicated by commitment under the Act.173 The
Act's purpose is not retributive because prior criminal conduct
"is used solely for evidentiary purposes;" because a criminal
conviction is not a prerequisite for commitment; and because
commitment, unlike a criminal statute, requires no finding of
scienter 7 4 Nor is the Act deterrent, because those confined
under the Act suffer from a "mental abnormality."175 Since, by
definition, they lack control over their actions, they probably
would not be deterred by the threat of confinement.
17 6
While acknowledging that the Act institutes involuntary
confinement, Justice Thomas deemed this insufficient to sup-
port a conclusion that such restraint constitutes punishment.
1 77
Protecting the public, said Justice Thomas, is a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective, and detaining people who are both dan-
gerous and mentally ill is a "classic example of nonpunitive
detention." 78 He pointed out, "If detention for the purpose of
protecting the community from harm necessarily constituted
"AId. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994)).









punishment, then all involuntary civil commitments would have
to be considered punishment. But we have never so held."' 79
Justice Thomas next rejected Hendricks' contention that
the State's intent to punish him is evidenced by the indetermi-
nate duration of his confinement. 80 The duration of detention,
Justice Thomas reasoned, is clearly connected to the stated pur-
pose of the Act-i.e., to hold the individual until he ceases to
pose a danger to the public. 1 ' The detained person may be
freed as soon as he is judged "safe to be at large.' 82
Hendricks' next claim, also dismissed by Justice Thomas,
was "that the State's use of procedural safeguards traditionally
found in criminal trials makes the proceedings here criminal
rather than civil.' 83 The employment of such devices is not suf-
ficient to render the proceeding criminal in nature.'84 Accord-
ing to Justice Thomas, these standards are evidence only that
the state has been extremely careful in its application of this
civil procedure.""
Finally, Justice Thomas responded to Hendricks' argument
that because no treatment is offered, confinement pursuant to
the Act is merely punishment under a different name.' Justice
Thomas rejected this argument because it assumes the existence
of available treatment which Kansas chooses not to provide. 87
Although the Kansas Supreme Court found that treatment un-
der the Act "is incidental, at best,"'' ss Justice Thomas proposed
two scenarios in which the failure to provide treatment would
not lead to the conclusion that Hendricks' confinement is puni-
tive. 89 On the one hand, if no effective treatment is available
for sexually violent predators, then there is no constitutional
'I7 (emphasis in original).
180 Id
1811&
82 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
1'3 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083. Procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Act in-
clude the right to counsel, the right to be examined by an expert, and the right to a
trial byjury. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06 (1994 & Supp. 1996). See also discussion of
the Act supra at text accompanying notes 15-35.





Id. (citing In reHendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (1996)).
,88 Id. at 2084.
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violation in confining such predators merely for the purpose of
protecting others.9 As long as proper procedures are followed,
argued Justice Thomas, civil detainment is a constitutionally
permissible method for protecting the public from a potentially
dangerous person.191 He noted: "To conclude otherwise would
obligate a State to release certain confined individuals who were
both mentally ill and dangerous simply because they could not
be successfully treated for their afflictions."1 92
On the other hand, wrote Justice Thomas, if Hendricks'
condition is treatable, but treatment is merely a secondary goal
of the Act, then it cannot be claimed that punishment is the
state's sole intention in applying the Act.'98 States are given
broad authority regarding implementation of treatment pro-
194
grams.
Justice Thomas concluded by pointing out that the charac-
terization of the Act as civil, rather than criminal, destroyed
Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post facto claims. 9 The
Double Jeopardy Clause protects individuals from being twice
prosecuted or twice punished for a single offense, but the civil
proceedings under the Act qualify as neither prosecution nor as
punishment.196 The Ex Post Facto Clause likewise applies only
to punitive measures, and thus is not implicated by the non-
punitive confinement to which Hendricks was subjected. 7
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy, who also joined the majority opinion, cau-
tioned against the possibility that civil confinement could be
used improperly for the purpose of deterrence and/or retribu-
tion.198 He stated that the furtherance of such goals is reserved





'9' Id. at 2085 n.4.
'.. Id. at 2085.
'6 d. at 2086.
197 Id.
'




C. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENT
Writing for the dissent,2° Justice Breyer agreed with the ma-
jority that the Act satisfies due process requirements, but argued
that in applying the Act to Hendricks, Kansas intended to pun-
ish Hendricks.20 1 Because Hendricks committed his crimes prior
to the statute's enactment, such application would make the Act
an unconstitutional ex post facto law. °2
1. The Due Process Claim
Justice Breyer agreed that the Due Process Clause does not
prevent Kansas from confining Hendricks under the civil pro-
cedure established by the Act.20 3 In support of this conclusion,
he listed three factors: (1) much of the professional psychiatric
community classifies Hendricks' problem as a serious mental
disorder;24 (2) Hendricks is unable to control his own actions;205
and(3) Hendricks poses a serious danger to others.2
Justice Breyer believed the Kansas Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that due process is a bar to the Act was largely based on the
fact that Hendricks does not qualify for civil commitment under
Kansas' own civil commitment statute. 7 According to Justice
Breyer, however, the Kansas general civil commitment statute's
failure to include Hendricks indicates only a statutory organiza-
tional decision made by the Kansas legislature. 8 Such a choice
does not necessarily mean that any civil confinement outside of
the general statute is unconstitutional. 209
2. The Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Claims
Justice Breyer then discussed whether the Act is punitive
and therefore an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to
2'JoiningJustice Breyer's opinion were Justices Stevens and Souter. Justice Gins-
burg joined in respect to the sections on punishment and ex post facto laws, but not
the section on due process.
20'Hendricks, 117S. Ct. at 2088 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
Id (BreyerJ., dissenting).
20% Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
2" Id. at 2088-89 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
Id at 2089 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
27 Id (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the Treatment Act For Mentally Ill Persons,
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Hendricks. ° In concluding that the Act is punitive, Justice
Breyer pointed out some obvious ways in which civil commit-
ment pursuant to the Act resembles traditional criminal pun-
ishment: people are confined against their will;21' one of the
Act's goals is to prevent harm to others;212 and it uses people,
procedures, and standards traditionally associated with criminal
law.1 Although such similarities by themselves do not make the
statute criminal, neither, according to Justice Breyer, is the
"civil" label dispositive.2 4
Justice Breyer then looked to the Act's provision for treat-
ment as an important guide in discerning whether the Act's ob-
jective is punitive or nonpunitive. 5 Justice Breyer asserted, "[A]
statutory scheme that provides confinement that does not rea-
sonably fit a practically available, medically oriented treatment
objective, more likely reflects a primarily punitive legislative
purpose."2 As such, the Kansas legislature's primary goal in
creating the Act, he concluded, was punitive, and not civil.
217
There were a number of reasons for Justice Breyer's conclu-
sion. First, the Kansas Supreme Court already had found that
the legislative history and early implementation of the Act indi-
cated that treatment is not a significant purpose of the Act.
218
Second, Justice Breyer noted the delay in applying the Act to a
previously convicted offender until the end of his prison sen-
tence. 9 Such a delay makes treatment more difficult, but pun-
ishment more severe.220 Third, the statute does not allow for less
restrictive methods.2 Justice Breyer stated, "This Court has said
that a failure to consider, or to use, 'alternative and less harsh
methods' to achieve a nonpunitive objective can help to show
210 Id. at 2090 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
21 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
212 Id. at 2091 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
"' Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2" Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
211 Id at 2092 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
26 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
217 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
1 In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (1996). Such lower court evaluations of legis-
lative intent are usually given great weight by the Supreme Court. Hendricks, 117 S.
Ct. at 2092 (BreyerJ., dissenting).19' Hendrida, 117 S. Ct. at 2094 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
2" Id at 2095 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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that legislature's 'purpose... was to punish."'222 Fourth, Justice
Breyer compared the Kansas statute to the laws of sixteen other
states dealing with civil commitment of mentally abnormal,
sexually dangerous persons.22' Besides Kansas, only Iowa both
delays civil commitment (and consequent treatment) and fails
to explicitly consider less restrictive alternatives.2 4 But the Iowa
law, unlike that of Kansas, avoids ex post facto problems by ap-
plying prospectively only.
225
Justice Breyer concluded that Hendricks' confinement un-
der the Act constitutes punishment.2 26 It therefore violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause, since "the 1994 Act changed the legal
consequences that attached to Hendricks' earlier crimes, and in
a way that significantly 'disadvantage [d] the offender.'12 27
V. ANALYSIS
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act does not require a
finding of mental illness to confine someone in a civil proceed-
ing. That failure means that the Act violates constitutional due
process requirements. The Hendricks Court should have upheld
the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court on this issue, and
found the Act unconstitutional. Furthermore, despite the civil
label attached to the Kansas statute, Hendricks' confinement is
"punishment" for a criminal act, and therefore violates the
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. Consti-
tution.
A. THE ACT FAILS TO REQUIRE A FINDING OF MENTAL ILLNESS
The Hendricks Court should have held that because the Act
does not require a finding of "mental illness," the law fails to
meet one of the constitutional requirements in the two-prong
2Id (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
" Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). The other sexual offense commitment statutes which
Breyer examined were from the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, NewJersey, New Mexico, Oregon,
Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 2099 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C (West 1996).
Hencricks, 117 S. CL at 2095 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
"6 Id. at 2098 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,29 (1981)).
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test for civil commitment set out in Addington.2 s While the Act
requires a finding of "mental abnormality or personality disor-
der, ,2 such language fails the Addington test-contrary to Jus-
tice Thomas' opinion that it is equivalent to "mental illness." 2's
Though the Court has used various language to convey the
same meaning as "mental illness, '' 31 Justice Thomas failed to
address the telling factor that the Kansas legislature itself admit-
ted that persons covered by the Act do not have a mental ill-
ness.232 Granted, the Court has consistently allowed the states
flexibility in their choice of statutory language. In this in-
stance, however, the choice of language used in the Violent
Sexual Offender Act must be analyzed in conjunction with the
Kansas general civil commitment statute, which is specifically
applicable to mentally ill individuals. 4 By contrast, the Violent
Sexual Offender Act does not require a finding of mental ill-
ness. In fact, according to the Kansas legislature, it was enacted
specifically to apply to a category of individuals who are not
mentally ill.s 5
It may be true that a civil commitment statute could be writ-
ten in a manner consistent with due process requirements that
would allow Kansas to confine violent sexual offenders such as
Hendricks. However, this is not the statute which was written
and enacted by the Kansas legislature.
Whether Hendricks might be labeled mentally ill by the
psychiatric community is equally irrelevant. The test established
in Addington, and elucidated upon in Foucha, mandates that the
state require a finding of mental illness in a civil commitment
2' 441 U.S. 418 (1979). The Addington test for civil commitment requires that an
individual be proven both mentally ill and dangerous. Id. at 426. See discussion of
Addington, supra at text accompanying notes 94-103.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
2 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
2" See supra note 159.
212 The Act's preamble begins, "The legislature finds that a small but extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease
or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the
treatment act for mentally ill persons defined in K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq .. " KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
" See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
m Treatment Act For Mentally Ill Persons, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2901 to 59-2941,
59-2943, 59-2944 (1994) (repealed 1996).




procedure.2 3 6 Kansas failed to do this. The fatal flaw in the Act
lies not in the use of the language "mental abnormality or per-
sonality disorder" instead of "mental illness," but in the fact that
the law by its own terms is intended to apply to a category of
people the state believes does not suffer from mental illness.
Regardless of Kansas' interest in confining dangerous sexual of-
fenders, it may not do so in a civil proceeding absent a finding
of mental illness.
Justice Breyer, who agreed with the majority on the due
process question,237 addressed the impact of the Kansas general
civil commitment statute on the constitutionality of the Act.'8
However, he attributed the creation of the Act to a choice by
the Kansas legislature to organize its own state laws in a certain
fashion.239 In doing so, Justice Breyer too easily brushed aside a
key point. The Kansas legislature may enact a new statute if it
chooses. It would have no reason for doing so, however, unless
it determined that no existing law provided for the civil com-
mitment of a category of people whom it wanted to confine in-
definitely. The people to whom the Act applies do not suffer
from mental illness, and therefore could not be held under the
240general civil commitment statute.
In interpreting the underlying intent of state statutes, the
Court traditionally defers to the lower court decision.24' In this
case, the Kansas Supreme Court, interpreting the laws of its own
state, determined that the Act fails to require a finding of men-
tal illness.2  Hendricks is therefore analogous to Foucha 3 In
Foucha, the Court struck down a Louisiana civil commitment
statute that did not require a finding of mental illness.2 4 Civil
commitment in that case was disallowed because the State ex-
2m SeeFouchav. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 426 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 94-103, 115-23.
27 Justice Ginsburg was the sole dissenter on the due process issue. She did not
write an opinion.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2089 (BreyerJ., dissenting). See supra section IV.C.1.
239 Id. (Breyer,J., dissenting).
24 See Treatment Act For Mentally Ill Persons, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2901 to 59-
2941, 59-2943, 59-2944 (1994) (repealed 1996).
21, Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)).
2 In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 137 (1996).
2 4 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). See supra text accompanying notes 115-
23.
244 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71.
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plicitly admitted that Foucha was not mentally ill.24 In Hen-
dricks, the admission is implicit rather than explicit. Neverthe-
less, when the two Kansas civil commitment statutes are viewed
in conjunction, Kansas has admitted that Hendricks is not men-
tally ill, as dearly as Louisiana made the same admission about
Foucha. Hendricks, like Foucha, should be freed.
B. HENDRICKS' CIVIL CONFINEMENT VIOLATES THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND EX POST FACTO CLAUSES
Notwithstanding the Act's placement in the state's civil
code, Kansas punishes Hendricks by subjecting him to the Act's
proceedings. In so doing, the state violates the constitutional
prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.
Hendricks and the State of Kansas agree that the Double Jeop-
ardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses apply only in the case of a crimi-
nal sanction, not a civil one.26 Therefore, the issue is whether,
despite the Act's "civil" label, it should be considered "crimi-
nal. 247
The first step of the two-step Allen test is to look at the lan-
guage of the statute itself.2 48 While the Act is in the civil code,
that is not determinative. 249 The Act's language makes clear that
the legislature did not think that those persons subject to incar-
ceration under the Act suffer from a mental illness.25° Though
the Act does provide for treatment,25' the text of the Act makes
plain that such treatment was not the central concern of the leg-
islature. The obvious objective of the Act was the removal
2
" Id. at 80.
216 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
247 id.
24' Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986). The test formulated by the Allen
Court for determining whether a law should be considered criminal for constitutional
purposes involves first looking at the plain language of the statute and then at the
statute's underlying intent and effect. Id. at 368-69. See discussion of Allen, supra text
accompanying notes 49-64.
249 AlLen, 478 U.S. at 369.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994 & Supp. 1996). See discussion of the Act, su-
pra text accompanying notes 15-35.
1 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
212 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (stating that "[t]he legislature.
finds that sexually violent predators' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of preda-
tory sexual violence is high. The existing involuntary commitment procedure pursu-
ant to the treatment act for mentally ill persons defined in KSA. 59-2901 et seq. and




from the community of certain persons who are thought likely
to commit a crime.ss
Also relevant is the fact that the structure of the Act in sev-
eral ways is similar to a typical criminal law. Like criminal im-
prisonment, the result of civil commitment is involuntary
incarceration,25' and that incarceration is a basic objective of the
Act.25 The confinement triggered by the Act is imposed only on
persons who have committed a crime. 6 Procedures and stan-
dards implemented under the Act, including the use of prose-
cutors and defense attorneys, trial by jury, and a requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, are "traditionally associated
with the criminal law.
''257
Applying the second step of the Allen tests and looking be-
hind the Act's "civil" label bolsters the argument that its intent
and/or effect is obviously punishment. First, legislative history
sheds light on the legislature's goals. Then-Kansas State Attor-
ney General Robert Stephan made abundantly clear his belief
that dangerous sex offenders should never be released.25 Then-
Kansas Special Attorney General, now Kansas Attorney General,
Carla Stovall agreed, "We cannot open our prison doors and let
these animals back into our communities. If we do-we are ac-
complices to the atrocities which they will surely commit."
260
Testimony during hearings on the Act showed the lack of
concern about treatment. A representative of the Kansas Psy-
255 d
2" Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 (1997) (Breyer,J., dissenting).
" Id (BreyerJ., dissenting).
216 Id. at 2091 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a02, 59-29a03
(1994)).
21 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a06, 59-29a07
(1994)).
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986). See discussion of Allen, supra text ac-
companying notes 49-64.
259 Stephan testified in 1994 to the Kansas legislature:
Most new laws against criminal conduct tend to provide punishment after the
victimization has occurred. Senate Bill 525 will act prospectively and be preven-
tative of criminal conduct and not just punitive. You have a rare opportunity to
pass a law that will keep dangerous sex offenders confined past their scheduled
prison sentence. As I am convinced none of them should ever be released, I be-
lieve, as legislators, you have an obligation to enact laws that will protect our citi-
zens through incapacitation of dangerous offenders.
Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 5, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075).
21 Id. at 6. The purpose of the Act, according to Stovall, is that it "would allow us
to keep the sexually violent offenders locked up indefinitely." Id.
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chological Association cautioned that permanent incarceration
would result from civil commitment. 6' However, the legisla-
ture's purpose in enacting the statute was simply to incarcerate
persons such as Hendricks.262 Treatment was not on the agenda.
Further evidence that the intent of the law is punitive is
seen in the fact that implementation of the Act is delayed until
263the "anticipated release" of a prisoner, thereby lessening the
effect of any treatment while simultaneously maximizing pun-
ishment. In Hendricks' case, the State's lack of interest in pro-
viding treatment is starkly shown by the empirical evidence that
Hendricks simply did not receive any worthwhile treatment un-
til about a year into his confinement.
26
The lack of treatment for Hendricks was not due to a de-
termination by the Kansas legislature that there is no effective
treatment for violent sexual offenders. 26 5 Rather, the State has
paid lip service to providing treatment, but only as an excuse to
indefinitely detain individuals such as Hendricks.
The State's interest in confining Hendricks is admittedly a
legitimate one: Kansas is predicting that he will commit a crime
in the future.26  Hendricks might very well agree with such a
prediction.267 Nevertheless, the Constitution does not allow for
imprisonment based on a prediction of future criminal con-
duct.6 In Foucha, the Court unequivocally held that a predic-
* ' Tom Locke of the Kansas Psychological Association testified, "Lengthy periods
of commitment with little likelihood of release are almost inevitable. Perhaps that is
the goal of the statute." Id. at 7.
162Jim Blaufuss, a member of the Schmidt Task Force, stated at legislative hearings,
"Because there is no effective treatment for sex offenders, this Bill may mean a life
sentence for a felon that is considered a risk to women and children. SO BE IT" Pe-
titioner's Brief at 508aa, Hendricks (No. 95-1649).
23KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
' Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2097 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). At
Hendricks' state hearing, Dr. Charles Befort, the director of the program into which
Hendricks was placed, stated that sexually violent predators were receiving "essentially
no treatment," that Hendricks "has had no opportunity for meaningful treatment,"
and that Hendricks has "wasted ten months.., in terms of treatment." Id.
m The Act makes specific references to the "treatment needs" and "treatment mo-
dalities" of sexually violent predators, and says "a civil commitment procedure for the
long-term care and treatment of the sexually violent predator is found to be necessary
by the legislature." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
2 "The legislature.., finds that sexually violent predators' likelihood of engaging
in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high." Id.
'Petitioner's Brief at 11, Hendricks (No. 95-1649).
See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992).
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tion of dangerousness, standing alone, is not enough to allow
the State to impose civil confinement. 269 Additional proof of the
Kansas legislature's primarily punitive goal in creating the Act
lies in the fact that the Act does not provide for methods less re-
strictive than incarceration. 270 The use, or at a minimum the
consideration, of less strict methods would be expected if the
legislature's goal were truly nonpunitive7
Therefore, even though the statute has a civil label, the
Court should have held that punishment is the intent of the Act.
To further punish Hendricks, who already had been sentenced
to serve time in prison, and who already had served that time,
constitutes a violation of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court erred in Kansas v. Hendricks by allowing
the civil commitment of Leroy Hendricks under the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act. The Court should have held that
the Act does not satisfy the Addington test for civil commitment.
The Addington Court established that a finding of "mental ill-
ness" is a requisite for civil commitment. The Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act falls short of requiring such a finding, and
therefore should have been struck down as a violation of due
process. Furthermore, the clear intent of Kansas in implement-
ing the Act is to punish the perpetrators of sex crimes above and
beyond whatever sanctions are applied in the state criminal jus-
tice system. A second punishment for a single crime runs afoul
of the Constitution's prohibition on double jeopardy. In Hen-
dricks' case, since the statute was passed after the acts for which
he is being confined, its application to him also violates the con-
stitutional ban on ex post facto laws.
ELI M. RoLLMAN
9 Id. at 85.
270 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2094 (1997) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
271' IL
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